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  <title>dForts blog: Microsoft 365, security and AI for SMBs</title>
  <subtitle>Practical articles on Microsoft 365, cybersecurity, Copilot and automation, written by dForts certified consultants in Valencia, Spain.</subtitle>
  <link href="https://www.dforts.com/en/blog/feed.xml" rel="self"/>
  <link href="https://www.dforts.com/en/blog/"/>
  <id>https://www.dforts.com/en/blog/</id>
  <updated>2026-09-16T00:00:00.000Z</updated>
  <author><name>dForts</name></author>
  <entry>
    <title>MFA in Microsoft 365: why your SMB needs it and how to roll it out without locking anyone out</title>
    <link href="https://www.dforts.com/en/blog/mfa-microsoft-365-smb"/>
    <id>https://www.dforts.com/en/blog/mfa-microsoft-365-smb</id>
    <published>2026-09-16T00:00:00.000Z</published>
    <updated>2026-09-16T00:00:00.000Z</updated>
    <author><name>Sergio Cánovas</name></author>
    <summary>Multi-factor authentication stops most unauthorized access to Microsoft 365 accounts. How to enable it in a small business step by step, without leaving anyone locked out.</summary>
    <content type="html"><![CDATA[<p>If your company runs on Microsoft 365 and some accounts still sign in with just a password, this article is for you. Multi-factor authentication (MFA) is the security measure with the best effort-to-benefit ratio available today, and rolling it out properly doesn't have to be painful.</p>
<h2>What problem it solves</h2>
<p>Passwords leak. No matter how strong they are: they show up in breaches of other services, they get reused, and a well-crafted phishing email gets them. With MFA, even if someone has the password, they also need something only the user has (usually their phone) to get in.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>In practice, most of the unauthorized access we see in SMB tenants involves accounts without MFA. With MFA on, the attacker stays at the door.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>The three ways to enable it</h2>
<p>Microsoft 365 offers several routes, from least to most control:</p>
<ol>
<li><strong>Security Defaults.</strong> One switch. Requires MFA for everyone and blocks legacy authentication. Free, included in every plan. Ideal if you don't have Entra ID P1 licenses.</li>
<li><strong>Conditional Access.</strong> Rules like &quot;require MFA except from the office&quot; or &quot;block countries we never work from&quot;. Requires Entra ID P1, which is included in Microsoft 365 Business Premium and in E3/E5.</li>
<li><strong>Per-user MFA (legacy).</strong> Still exists, but Microsoft is retiring it. Don't start here.</li>
</ol>
<p>For most SMBs the answer is simple: if you have Business Premium, Conditional Access; if not, Security Defaults.</p>
<h2>How to roll it out without locking anyone out</h2>
<p>The usual fear is &quot;tomorrow nobody will be able to sign in&quot;. A bit of order avoids it:</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Give a week's notice</strong> and explain what will happen: on sign-in, users will be asked to set up the Microsoft Authenticator app.</li>
<li><strong>Prepare admin accounts first.</strong> They matter most and get attacked most.</li>
<li><strong>Shared accounts and service mailboxes:</strong> identify them beforehand. The usual move is to convert them into shared mailboxes with sign-in disabled, not to put MFA on them.</li>
<li><strong>Printers, scanners and legacy apps</strong> that send email over SMTP don't support MFA. They need a connector or an app password, and are worth reviewing one by one.</li>
<li><strong>Keep an emergency (break-glass) account</strong> excluded from the rules, with a long password stored outside the tenant.</li>
</ul>
<h2>Methods: what to recommend</h2>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Security</th>
<th>Convenience</th>
<th>Recommendation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Microsoft Authenticator (number matching)</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>The default choice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passkey (Authenticator or FIDO2 key)</td>
<td>Very high</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Admins first, then everyone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMS</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Temporary backup only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voice call</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Avoid</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h2>Passkeys: the next step</h2>
<p>Microsoft is clearly pushing towards a passwordless world, and in Microsoft 365 you can already work that way today. A <strong>passkey</strong> is a FIDO2 credential that lives on the phone, the computer or a hardware key, unlocked with the device's fingerprint, face or PIN. There is no password to steal and no code to type: the user approves the sign-in on their device and that's it.</p>
<p>What matters for an SMB:</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>It resists phishing.</strong> A passkey only works on the site it was created for. Even if a user lands on a fake Microsoft page, it cannot be used there. Not even the Authenticator app with push notifications guarantees that.</li>
<li><strong>It's already included.</strong> Entra ID supports passkeys in Microsoft Authenticator (iOS and Android) and FIDO2 security keys with no extra licensing; you enable it from the tenant's authentication methods.</li>
<li><strong>It's more convenient than MFA.</strong> One gesture on the phone replaces password + code. In practice, users welcome it more than they fear it.</li>
<li><strong>Start with admins and sensitive roles</strong>, using Conditional Access to require a &quot;phishing-resistant authentication strength&quot; for them. Then roll it out to everyone else.</li>
</ul>
<p>MFA remains the mandatory first step; passkeys are the destination worth reaching over the next year.</p>
<h2>After enabling it</h2>
<p>MFA isn't the end. The natural next steps are blocking legacy authentication (if Security Defaults hasn't already), reviewing who holds the Global Administrator role, and enabling risky sign-in alerts. But that's another article.</p>
<p>If you'd like us to review your tenant before touching anything, the <a href="/en/#contact">free audit</a> includes exactly this check.</p>
]]></content>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Shared mailboxes in Microsoft 365: when they save you a license and when they don&#39;t</title>
    <link href="https://www.dforts.com/en/blog/shared-mailboxes-vs-licenses"/>
    <id>https://www.dforts.com/en/blog/shared-mailboxes-vs-licenses</id>
    <published>2026-09-02T00:00:00.000Z</published>
    <updated>2026-09-02T00:00:00.000Z</updated>
    <author><name>Sergio Cánovas</name></author>
    <summary>info@, sales@, support@… A shared mailbox in Exchange Online needs no license, but it has limits. When to use one, when not to, and how to convert a user mailbox.</summary>
    <content type="html"><![CDATA[<p>Almost every company has addresses that belong to nobody in particular: <code>info@</code>, <code>accounts@</code>, <code>support@</code>. And in many tenants each one sits behind a fully licensed user that nobody uses for anything else. That's money down the drain, and one more account to protect.</p>
<h2>What a shared mailbox is</h2>
<p>A shared mailbox is an Exchange Online mailbox with no user attached. Nobody signs in to it: team members see it inside their own Outlook and can read and send as that address. <strong>It needs no license</strong> as long as it stays under 50 GB and doesn't use archiving or litigation hold.</p>
<h2>When it fits</h2>
<ul>
<li>Generic addresses handled by several people (<code>info@</code>, <code>orders@</code>).</li>
<li>Mailboxes of former employees that must be kept for a while without paying a license.</li>
<li>Resource calendars: rooms, vehicles, loanable equipment.</li>
</ul>
<h2>When it doesn't</h2>
<ul>
<li>If someone needs to <strong>sign in</strong> directly to that mailbox (phone, Teams, applications).</li>
<li>If it will exceed <strong>50 GB</strong> or needs an <strong>online archive</strong>: then it must be assigned an Exchange Online Plan 2 license or similar.</li>
<li>If it's used to <strong>send from a device</strong> (scanner, ERP) over authenticated SMTP: it can't authenticate because it has no password.</li>
</ul>
<h2>Converting a user mailbox into a shared one</h2>
<p>It's a reversible change with no data loss:</p>
<ol>
<li>In the Exchange admin center, open the user's mailbox and choose <strong>Convert to shared mailbox</strong>.</li>
<li>Wait for the conversion to finish (a few minutes).</li>
<li>Grant <strong>Full Access</strong> and <strong>Send As</strong> permissions to the people who need to use it.</li>
<li>Remove the license from the original user. If they have data in OneDrive, save it first: OneDrive isn't kept with the mailbox.</li>
<li>Block sign-in on the account. A shared mailbox with an active password is an attack vector with no MFA.</li>
</ol>
<h2>A detail almost nobody checks</h2>
<p>Shared mailboxes keep their account in Entra ID. If you don't block sign-in and they have no MFA, anyone who gets the password can walk in. It's one of the points we always review in a <a href="/en/services/microsoft-365-security-audit-hardening">security audit</a>.</p>
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  </entry>
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